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RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR WOODHOUSE
Janet L. Dolgin°
In her Afterword' to Solomon's Dilemma: Exploring Parental
Rights, Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse asserts that I advocate

judicial reliance on the notion of intent to determine parenthood in
certain cases occasioned by reproductive technology.2 I do not, and in
the paper to which Professor Woodhouse referred3 did not, advocate
such a position. In my paper, I did analyze the implications of such

reliance by a number of courts. Professor Woodhouse confused my
analysis with advocacy. In so doing, Professor Woodhouse weakened
the effects and potential benefits of both analysis and advocacy. Analy-

sis does not necessarily imply advocacy, though obviously analysis can
be, and often is, used in the service of advocacy, just as advocacy can

become the subject of analysis. The dialectic between the two can further the purposes of each, but only as long as the distinction is clearly
recognized. To underscore Professor Woodhouse's error, I shall review

my analysis of judicial reliance on4 the notion of intent in recent cases
involving reproductive technology.

* Hofstra Law School, Professor of Law. B.A. Barnard College; J.D. Yale Law School;
M.A., Ph.D. (Anthropology) Princeton University. Some of the issues considered are presented in
greater detail in a book I am writing about the law's response to reproductive technology.
scheduled to be published by New York University Press.
1. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Afierword: Deconstructing Solomon's Dilemma, 26 CON. L
REv. 1525 (1994). Volume 26:4 comprises papers presented at the 1994 symposium entitled,
Solomon's Dilemma: Exploring Parental Rights.
2. Ld.at 1529.
3. Janet L. Dolgin, The 'Intent' of Reproduction: Reproductive Technologies and the ParentChild Bond, 26 CoNN. L. REV. 1261 (1994).
Later, Professor Woodhouse criticized what she mistook for my advocacy of reliance on
intent in such cases: "[w]hile I found the arguments raised by Professors Dolgin and Robson
persuasive from an adult's point of view, I worry that children am objectified when their status
is defined by others' intent." Woodhouse, supra note 2, at 1529. The reference to Professor
Robson is to Ruthann Robson, Third Parties and the Third Ser: Child Custody and Lesbian
Legal Theory, 26 CoNN. L. REv. 1377 (1994).
4. The central cases analyzed in The 'Intent' of Reproduction include: Davis v. Davis, 842
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Reproductive technology has confronted a society and a legal system already undergoing major transformations in the meaning and
scope of family with a newer and more profound disruption to traditional families-a disruption caused by the challenge reproductive technology poses to familiar biological assumptions through which families
and familial relations have long been understood. For decades, Western
society understood human reproduction to begin with sexual intercourse
between a man and a woman, to include the fertilization of an egg in
the body of the woman and then to pass to gestation and finally to the
birth of a baby from the body of the woman in whom fertilization
occurred.6 Now, as a result of reproductive technology, the spatial and
temporal dimensions of human reproduction have been disrupted dramatically. Embryos may be conceived outside a woman's body, and
may be frozen for increasingly long periods of time before being allowed to develop into babies. Further, ova may be fertilized after both
gamete donors have died, and news media report seriously on the possibility of pregnant men.7
In fact, changes stemming from the advent and explosive development of reproductive technology within the past twenty-five years have
occurred so quickly that the culture almost cannot accommodate them.
As a result of the disruptions posed by reproductive technology, which
compound other, older disruptions to established understandings of the
family in the West, courts, like the society they reflect, flounder in
bewilderment.
Most generally, that bewilderment stems from the conflicting appeal,
to the society and to the law, of traditional families-committed, hierarchically organized families, grounded in notions of inexorable
truth-and of families created through choice, and in the name of au-

S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d
776 (Cal. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 206 (1993), and cert. dismissed sub. nom. Baby Boy
J. v. Johnson, 114 S. Ct. 374 (1993); McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1994); and Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
5. Transformations in family law in the past several decades include, among other things,
the acceptance of cohabitation agreements and antenuptial agreements and the so-called "divorce
revolution" which replaced or augmented laws that permitted divorce only upon one party's
successful accusation of the other's "fault" with no-fault criteria for divorce. See Jana B. Singer,
The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1443 (discussing recent changes in family

law).
6. See Janet L. Dolgin, The Law Debates the Family: Reproductive Transformations, 7
YAE J. L. & FEM. 37 (discussing implications of shifting vision of human reproduction).
7. Dick Teresi, How to Get a Man Pregnant, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 27, 1994, § 6 (Magazine),

at 54.
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tonomous individuality. In responding to this conflict, courts have been
constructing a series of strategic responses that seem, at least for the
moment, to mediate between the allure of the traditional home, and the
allure of families that replicate and amalgamate with the contractual

forms of the marketplace.
Judicial reliance on intent in several recent cases involving reproductive technology represents one such response.' In Johnson v.

Calvert, for instance, a gestational surrogacy case involving a dispute
between a surrogate, gestational mother and the "intending" parents who

contributed the gametes from which the child involved was produced,
the California Supreme Court determined the "natural mother" by reference to the parties' intentions." The Court declared that when biological maternity is separated into a genetic and a gestational aspect, "she
who intended to procreate the child--that is, she who intended to bring

about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own-is the
natural mother under California law."" In the Court's view, the intend-

ing mother was, almost in the nature of the case, the better mother, the
mother whose wish to be a mother would constitute her social maternity."2

Thus, for the California Supreme Court, reliance on intent was not

8. Other, comparable judicial responses are being constructed at the same time. For instance,

judicial reliance on the best-interests standard in cases occasioned by reproductive technology
provides an alternative strategy for mediating among the conflicts and confusions that reproductive technology creates. This strategy, like reliance on the notion of intent, has failed to provide
a satisfactory framework for imagining and regulating the changing family. See Janet L Dolgin,
Suffer the Children: Nostalgia, Contradiction, and the New Reproductive Technologies, ARIZ. S.
LJ. (forthcoming).
9. 851 P.2d at 782.
10. The Court was not using the notion of "intent" (and "intending parents") as a simple
tool for discovering a child's best interests. The Court wrote:
The dissent would decide parentage based on the best interests of the child. Such an
approach raises the repugnant specter of governmental interference in matters implicating our most fundamental notion of privacy, and confuses concepts of parentage
and custody. Logically, the determination of parentage must precede, and should not
be dictated by, eventual custody decisions ....
851 P.2d at 782 n.l0.
11. 851 P.2d at 782.
12. The court asserted:
The mental concept of the child is a controlling factor of its creation, and the originators of that concept merit full credit as conceivers. The mental concept must be
recognized as independently valuable; it creates expectations in the initiating parents
of a child, and it creates expectations in society for adequate performance on th: part
of the initiators as parents of the child.
lId at 783 (quoting Andrea E. Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE L.J. 187, 196 (1986) (emphasis added by California Supreme
Court).
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a simple substitute for reliance on the terms of the contract into which
the parties had entered. The court could have relied on that contract,
but it did not. Instead, it expressly determined that the contract entered
into by Johnson and the Calverts did not violate California public policy and referred to that contract for evidence of the parties' intentions.
Not surprisingly, courts have been reluctant to rely unqualifiedly on
contracts in such cases." Such reliance would concede absolutely that
traditional families have been replaced, in the law's view, by families
created through bargained choice.14 Courts have been reluctant to concede this. Instead, by relying on the notion of intent rather than directly
on contracts, courts have been able to avoid the implications of completely amalgamating family law and contract law with regard to the
parent-child connection.
Rather than acknowledge the move toward contract, courts have
used the concept of intent to meld the prerogatives of contract and
those of traditional, old-fashioned families. Thus, in Johnson, the California court made the notion of maternal intent resemble closely traditional understandings of biological maternity. Such intent, as described
by the court fosters commitment and guarantees enduring love.
However, by associating maternal intent with biological maternity as
it did, the Johnson court warped the meaning of intent since it can be
associated legitimately only with a world of contract and choice and not
with a world of inexorable truth and lasting hierarchical connections.
Intent hinges on will and reason. Therefore, almost inevitably, intentions
change. The Johnson court posited a primordial intention, immune from
the consequences of subsequent shifts in the parties' intentions, but as a
practical matter, intentions are always complicated and shifting.
5
Therefore, judicial reliance on intent in cases such as Johnson'

13. See infra note 14.
14. The New Jersey trial court in Baby M, an early surrogacy dispute among a surrogate
mother and the biological father along with his wife, seemed to uphold the contract into which
the parties had entered. However, the trial court judge began his opinion by denying that his
contractual analysis was determinative. Judge Sorkow for the New Jersey trial court wrote: "The
primary issue to be determined by this litigation is what are the best interests of a child until
now called 'Baby M.' All other concerns raised by counsel constitute commentary." In the
Matter of Baby M, 525 A.2d 1128 (NJ. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1987), aff d in part and rev'd in
part, 527 A.2d 1227 (NJ. 1988). See Janet L. Dolgin, Status and Contract in Surrogate Moth.
erhood: An Illumination of the Surrogacy Debate, 38 BuFF. L. REv. 515, 539, n. 112 and
accompanying text (1990) (analyzing Judge Sorkow's assertion).
15. In McDonald v. McDonald a New York court relied on Johnson to declare an intending
and gestational, but not genetic, mother the real mother under New York Law. McDonald v.
McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
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cannot substitute for biology as the ground on which families are constructed and understood. Moreover, reliance on intent is unworkable in
practice because no clear measure exists by which conflicting intentions
can be delineated, identified and weighed.
As summarized briefly above, my analysis of the limitations of intent as mediator between the imperatives of two probably irreconcilable
views of the family (and of reality) is just that: an analysis. It implies
the ineffectiveness of intent as a judicial or social tool. It certainly does
not imply or explicitly assert that courts should rely (as a number of
courts have relied) 16 on the notion of intent to determine parentage in
cases involving reproductive technology. Advocates of such use of
intent exist.17 I am not among them, however. My essay was designed

to analyze, not to advocate. While analysis and advocacy can, and often
should, serve one another, analysis can be effective only when it is
rigorously distinguished from recommendation.

16. See supra note 4.
17. See e.g., John Lawrence Hfill, What Does It Afean to Be a 'Parent?.: The Clans of
Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L Rev. 353 (1991); Marjorie Maguire
Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wisc. L REv. 297.

